THE HALA FOUNDATION FOR ARAB-AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

Women and Change in the Arab World: April 1991.

Anybody discussing the issue of women and change in the Arab world in the seventies could easily claim that the trend was towards more emancipation and a more activist feminist agenda. Reading the women's literature until the sixties, one sees that they truly believe that everything was within their reach. Women involved then felt that they were making history and that they were capable of effecting a total transformation of their societies. They were comfortable that they could join the developed world only if they achieved their national aspirations and if they gained the necessary education.

There was no consciousness of the problematic inherent in development and how it would affect women, nor were they aware of the potency of the forces of reaction in their midst and how their mistakes were going to be exploited by these forces. It was believed that, as men and women became more educated, it would naturally follow that women would be able to participate on an equal footing in the development of their societies.

The women's movement until the mid-sixties seem to be a linear movement concentrating on access to education and political rights. All these two levels it was achieving incremental gains: women gain suffrage in most Arab countries, veiling was no more an issue in these countries, and the number of educated women was steadily increasing. In fact, in a number of countries, women were being elected to parliament, there were women cabinet ministers, and they were becoming visible in many domains which were previously denied to them. Most importantly, headway was being made in many Arab countries to interpret Islam liberally, especially as pertains to women. For example, Tunisia enacted legislation prohibiting polygamy and changed the personal status laws in such a way as to make them equitable to women. It also reinterpreted the laws pertaining to inheritance to the advantage of women. Egypt was also moving in the same direction, not prohibiting but limiting polygamy and regularizing divorce, and all Arab-Muslim women were hopeful that their own countries would be following suit.

In fact, everyone considering the situation in the sixties could brag about the achievements and argue that there was no inherent impediment to progress. There was no realization that is modernizing trend was trespassing on a domain which had provided their people with a strong sense of identity; that the bewildering changes which were taking place were triggering deep-seated fears which in turn translated into clinging back to the vestiges of tradition to satisfy the psychological need for a minimum sense of identity.

From the middle of the seventies, therefore, there surfaced a counter trend, reacting obsessively to westernization and adopting a fundamentalist attitude. The two trends are estranged from each other. They use a different language, different symbols and different modes of expression. The emergence of a new movement jolted the leadership of the modernizing movement, which discovered how unaware it was of the impact it was having on a large number of women and men in their societies. Most traumatic was the realization that the fundamentalist movement had a large number of women followers and that, often, women were not coerced into the veiling, as many would like to believe, but rather were adopting the veil voluntarily. The struggle of a whole generation of Arab-Muslim women seemed in vain. The woman's movement was thus jolted to reassess itself and address the hard questions of where did it fail, and what went wrong and why?

The reasons, in my opinion, are many. I will discuss only two of them, however, which I think are the most important. They are: one, the problems inherent in the genesis of the movement; and two, the problems engendered by development as pertain specifically to women.

From its inception, the idea of emancipation of women in the Arab world was inextricably linked to the issues of modernization and nationalism and was led by upper-class women. The champions of the cause of women were, from the middle of the 19th century, men were also modernizing and nationalist elites. The theory was that one of the main reasons why the Arabs had regressed and the West and progressed was that, in the Arab world, half the population, women, burdens on society rather than contributors to the development of their societies. Furthermore, it was argued that because women were the primary party responsible for the education of children, their own education was a necessity if the new generation was to be more enlightened than the previous ones. The education of women and their social involvement and contribution were thus deemed necessary for the advancement of the whole nation.

Hence, we find that the first advocates for the emancipation of women were men. In fact, they were, in most cases, highly-respected Muslim religious ?ulema, like Sheikh Rifa?ah Rafi? al-Tahtawi, Sheikh Muhammad ?Adbuh, ?Abdel-Rahman al-Kawakibi and, most importantly for women, Qassem Amin. These men argued that there is nothing in Islam which prevents the unveiling of women, their education and their participation on an equal footing with men in society. By highlighting the liberal tradition of Islam, they were asserting that progress was not an imitation of Western practices, or that there was anything in it which was in contradiction with Islam, but rather was in harmony with the essence of Muslim religion.

The fact that the prodding to participate was advanced by man blurred for women the natural resistance men would exhibit once women actually started participating and asking for their rights. Because Arab women were mainly concerned with the advancement of their society as a whole, they did not perceive their struggle as their western sisters did, in opposition to man, but rather as a partnership where women and men were together forging a new future. They believed that, by actively participating in the nationalist struggle, they were asserting their equality, ridding themselves of their inferiority complexes, ridding man of his chauvinism, and thus changing social relations so that the man-woman equation is based on mutual trust and mutual respect. Unfortunately this did not prove to be true. Huda Shaarawi, who led the women's movement in Egypt and participated in the nationalist struggle against the British, was shocked that the nationalist leadership, once they came to power, would resist giving women their suffrage and would reluctantly accept the most benign demands of women, such as legislating a minimum age for marriage. The same happened with the Algerian women who thought that their active participation in the struggle against the French would naturally translate into gains for women. They too were shocked to realize how conservative their comrades-in-arms turned out to be once independence was achieved. Other examples abound.

Furthermore, the fact that the leadership of the women's movement was upper-class meant that the problems they were concerned with were particular to their condition rather than of universal concern to women. Thus it is that the literature, for example, is replete with a question of veiling and unveiling, which is mainly a problem for the upper-class Muslim woman, for women in the villages never failed, and in towns, women in lower classes do not wear the veil either.

The problems engendered by development policies, and the frustrations and dislocations generated by them, are many. To such problems have affected women in particular, namely consumerism and the revisionist theories which were the consequence of the disenchantment with the modernizing process.

Consumerism affected women in as much as one of the most important factors which characterized it is the emphasis it places on cash. The need for cash became so acute that it changed attitudes about the relative value of specific types of work. In the past, neither men nor women were paid for performing their traditional family duties.

Today, the availability of work for money is critical because some family needs can only be met by cash. Unpaid traditional work does not evoke respect any more. And thus women, who used to assume a large share of these duties, have seen their importance diminished and, consequently, their authority within the family eroded, although it is impossible to determine the cash value of their work in the fields and in subsistence economies, where most food, clothes, shoes and other necessities are homemade from scratch. Let me illustrate it. In a series of interviews, Nadia Hijab asked men whether their wives work. They asserted that they don't. Then she asked them if they would have to hire someone if they did not have a wife to do her work. They invariably said yes. So obviously the wives work. But it is not considered work unless it has a cash value. The loss of respect for this necessary work is what explains the fact that women feel so strongly about educating their daughters, hoping that this would help them earn a decent living and thus provide them with a better life than they themselves had. These women showed tremendous resentment when they find themselves in the position of having to take their daughters out of school to help in the struggle for the family survival, which happens quite often.

Consumerism introduced by the West has also placed an undue emphasis on the outer appearance of women, their bodies, their hair and their way of dressing. This has underlined their role as sexual objects and led to further subjugation. Most women wearing the "Islamic dress" point to economic reasons. They argue that their way of dressing, besides blurring class distinction in outside appearances, also frees women from the bourgeois consumer-oriented society which imposes yearly fashions on women.

Many explain it in terms of rebellion against this western encroachment on their lives. They articulate it in terms of a reassertion of their identity. In numerous instances, it is a statement to the effect that "I do not have to be Western in my appearance to be efficient, effective, and have a sense of purpose and to achieve." In some instances, it is not only an anti-Western reaction but there is also a positive statement. One woman I talked to pointed out to me that wearing the "Islamic dress" made her a "person" in public. It made people treat her more as a person than as a woman. Hence, her way of dressing "de-womanized" her and resolved for her the question of her sexuality.

The other problems engendered by development relates to the high expectations which did not materialize. While this is a problem for both men and women, it is much more acute as pertains to women. For, in a job market which is fluid, where unemployment is rampant, which hardly has a place for men let alone women, it becomes extremely difficult for women to compete, especially when society still perceives a man as needing work more than a woman because he is head of the family and the primary breadwinner. Women are perceived as a threat to men in the competition for the few jobs that are available. This is compounded by the double-edged sword of legislation for women as pertains to equal pay and maternity leave and other benefits, such as day care centers for places which employ a certain number of women. While these were legislated in most Arab countries and helped improve the lot of the working women, they also led to the reluctance of employers to employ women. For the employer, at all times, would prefer to employ a man, an unmarried woman or an older woman rather than a woman who might still need to be given maternity leave or provided with the expense of childcare. This obviously leads to discrimination, and more disappointment for women.

These and other problems associated with development led to a revisionist literature, questioning the value of development and stressing the traditional role of women in society in the name of authenticity and a return to the roots. The result was a countermovement, emphasizing the woman's duties towards the family and the importance of her staying at home as opposed to the earlier movement encouraging her to participate in the development of our society.

Faced with this situation, the liberal women's leadership also had a question many old assumptions which used to be taken for granted. She realized that she was paying the penalty for the inability of her traditional society to cope with the problems that were emerging as consequences of the modern, scientific, technological and cultural revolutions. She also realized that recoiling to fundamentalist, defensive positions and attitudes is also a penalty for the level of alienation and patronization that the westernized elites demonstrated, and the degree of their submissiveness to Western political and strategic dictates. The challenge as it is perceived by the Muslim Arab woman now is to find the formula to achieve the required transformation of her society, not by reacting and penalizing, but through a steady in incremental process which would allow her to modernize without, for that matter, losing her culture, her tradition, and way of life or her distinct identity.

The discourse, as it now emerges, is putting back into question three main issues. First, what is the role of the Arab woman in the political upheavals and crises that pervade the Arab world? Second, what is her role in the development of her country? Third, how can she effect change in her own condition as a woman and affirm her equality while retaining her Arab-Muslim identity?

The excessive involvement of the Arab woman in political matters lies at the root of the misunderstanding between her and Western feminists. Arab women are often criticized for their insistence on raising political issues in conjunction with women's issues. They were vehemently attacked by the American delegations in particular after both the Mexico and the Copenhagen Conferences for injecting politics into the debate. Betty Friedan, for example, lamented this and asserted that women's issues should be insulated from political concerns. But Betty Friedan's priorities are not and cannot be the priorities of our women. We, in the Arab world, live in a time of social transformation in most countries, a war situation in some, and an acute economic crisis in others. In all cases, women see their role is part and parcel of the national purpose, rather than as one section of society struggling for its rights. Arab women realize that social change is essential to effect political change in our part of the world. Yet, the political and economic seemed most of the time to override social concerns. The political most often takes on such dramatic and tragic dimensions that our ability to focus on the social is derailed by the impact of the crisis. Who can expect the Lebanese or Palestinian woman, for example, to be concerned about her condition as a woman, when she, like the men and the children, is faced with the existential reality of survival on a daily basis? Who can expect the Iraqi woman today to be concerned about her condition when the future of her whole society is at stake? And who can expect the Sudanese woman to think about women's issues when she is facing famine? Crises and upheavals alike have been at the center of our concerns throughout the century. True, they do not always take the tragic dimensions they have today, but they have been there making us consumed with national matters. So, as a result, Arab women in general are more politicized than womanized.

Most often, Arab women participated in the national agenda with the conviction that it had a functional aspect, namely, the prospect of socio-economic liberation of their society, and their own liberation as women. In fact, in most instances, feminist consciousness and the self-awareness of their condition as women, their role, and their rights, was a direct result of their political involvement, not the other way around. Fadwa Tuquan offers us an example in the piece where she rebels against her father who, on the one hand, expects her to participate in the national struggle like her brother, and, on the other hand, wants to limit her activities because she is a woman.

So, obviously, women did not believe, upon realizing their political objectives, that the national agenda would achieve for women to level of socio-economic liberation commensurate with their participation. And, if they ever believe so, they soon learned, especially after the Algerian experience, that, to the contrary, the aura of national liberation could actually provide the leaderships with the momentum to pursue traditional suppression and perpetuate tenants of inequality and disenfranchisement. Yet, Arab women realize fully that their ultimate liberation cannot be achieved except through dynamic political involvement. Thus, they partake in the overall national liberation struggle, while seeking to prioritize their social and economic objectives. In this case, the Palestinian women's movement is the best example of women who are aware of the dialectical relation between the social and political.

The other two issues, namely participation in the development of their countries and retaining their Arab-Muslim identity, seem contradictory, for participation means securing for women equal rights with men which would naturally lead to the dismantling of the traditional institutions that embody this inequality. But what are these institutions? In the final report of the U.N. Decade of Women, the Arabs asserted that the institutions which distinguish them from the rest of the world are the family and Islam. The question is whether these are impediments to progress and change.

In the case of the family, I would argue that insistence on preserving it is a genuine Arab concern. One cannot overemphasize the importance of the family. For the Arab woman the choice between achievement, as career and self-fulfillment, and the family is clear: the family comes first. And, the family, to us, still to a great extent means the extended family. We invest a lot of time in it. Not only does it give us the warmth of relationship, it also gives us a great deal of security that we will not be sick alone, that we will not die alone. In the context of the Arab family, a person has access to many people of the same generation, our older and more experienced, to discuss problems without having to seek the help of a psychologist or psychiatrist. This is why Halim Barakat could argue that, in the Arab world, it is easier to be estranged from religion, politics and society than from the family.

Women are the pillars of the family, and, as such, to preserve the family, is argued that women have to keep their traditional roles within the family. Women are perceived as a repository of religion, culture and tradition. And the extended family, in the context of developing nations like the Arab world, is not necessarily an impediment to women's progress and participation. For, in the absence of institutions such as child care centers, fast-food stores, and other amenities, the extended family actually resolves for many women the problem of their working outside the home, for they can leave their children with their older mothers and they don't have to come back home to cook from scratch.

As pertains to Islam, it is of course an important factor in any discussion of women in development. Yet, one could argue that the need for women in the workforce is more important. Jordan is a case in point. In the seventies, and as a result of the oil boom, tens of thousands of Jordanian men left to work in the Gulf. A shortage of manpower occurred and women were encouraged by the government to replace them. They started making important gains on every level unhampered by any religious impediment, when unemployment started rising again as a result of a depressed economy in the Gulf states and led to the return home of many Jordanians. At that time, emphasis was again placed on Islam and the family in an attempt to take women off the job market.

The use and misuse of Islam by governments and political elites in the Arab world is, in fact, very interesting. Why is it, one wonders, that often the necessity of using most in-laws is emphasized only as it pertains to women and not, for example, as pertains economic laws, penal codes or other laws which are also stipulated by the Quran? It is hard to believe that governments that ask women not to participate in public life are doing so because they want to abide by Islam, when we do not even considering closing banks with money-bearing interests, or prohibiting the use of alcohol, for example. The hypocrisy of it is obvious. The Arab family is viewed as our "health and life insurance policies." The greatest resistance to change comes from the family, for in view of a very precarious future on many levels the family remains one of the few stable institutions to which people cling.

Hidden under most rationalizations of the importance of this role is the real fear of the breakdown of the family and what that has led to in the West in terms of loneliness of the elderly, drug abuse, alcoholism and violence. Many Arabs argue that the thriving of psychiatric practices in the West is a direct result of the loneliness which is itself a consequence of the individualism engendered by the West.

Of course, Islam interpreted conservatively discriminates against women, especially in the domain of family law. Yet, Islam can also be interpreted literally, as it was for a long time, to rediscover its humanist revolutionary spirit. The challenge facing the Muslim woman is how to make the consensus of the Muslims ready to accept these interpretations without feeling that this, in any way, contradicts the central parts of the doctrine.

In conclusion, a total revision of the attitude of women towards change is now taking place in the Arab world. The revision was necessitated by the fundamentalist reaction to the liberal leaderships. It was also a result of the failure of their earlier attempts at development which were not sufficiently critical of Western models. The new direction is towards deconstructing the earlier models with an enhanced awareness that, while we are, on the one hand, fascinated with the West and its achievements, on the other hand, we have a great civilization that we would like to preserve, and a great culture that we are proud of and would like to enrich. How can our societies effect all the necessary changes for development without losing our Arab identity? That is the main question for Arab women at this point in time.

This article was originally published in August 1991.